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Abstract 
 
Recently, microfinance is coming under public and media attacks. The microcredit crisis 
following from microfinance-induced suicides in 2010 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh 
indicates that weak corporate governance and imprudent risk taking have far-reaching 
consequences. Yet, analyses of corporate governance mechanisms among microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) remain underdeveloped. As a response, this study examines the impact of 
CEO power on MFI risk taking by deriving explicit predictions of this effect from a 
characterization of the microfinance industry. Based on a sample of 280 microfinance 
institutions, our results suggest that powerful CEOs of microfinance nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) have more decision-making freedom than powerful CEOs of other 
types of MFIs. This induces them to make more extreme decisions that increase risk. 
Furthermore, the decision-making freedom powerful CEOs have in NGOs appears to lead to 
worse decisions, because the presence of powerful CEOs in microfinance NGOs is associated 
with lower performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The literature on corporate governance and its effects on firms and commercial banks has 
grown quite voluminous, yet analyses of corporate governance mechanisms among 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries remain underdeveloped and 
inconclusive (for a review, see Labie and Mersland, 2011). More generally, while our 
knowledge of strategic management and in particular governance has increased considerably, 
little research has been conducted outside the US and the UK (Elbanna and Child, 2007), let 
alone in developing countries. The minimal attention to the role of corporate governance in 
MFIs is unfortunate though, because MFIs serve hundreds of millions of poor and vulnerable 
people, and ultimately, governance systems may explain why some MFIs succeed while 
others fail (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). According to CSFI (2011), corporate 
governance quality constitutes a key risk for MFIs and the vulnerable customers they serve, 
especially because the best practice governance mechanisms seem not to have penetrated 
these areas (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland and Strøm, 2009). And yet still the majority of 
explanations of MFI performance continue to focus on innovative contract designs 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). When research does consider corporate governance in 
MFIs, it cites relationships between different governance variables and MFI performance. No 
study deals with risk analysis, though risk taking remains critical to decision making, with 
important implications for MFI performance and survival. 
Furthermore, microfinance is coming under public and media attacks. As if in a 
backlash to widespread praise (e.g., United Nations declaring 2005 the Year of Microcredit; 
the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Mohammad Yunus and Grameen Bank in 2006), 
microfinance is being strongly challenged. Is the provision of tiny loans actually an effective 
means to lift poor people out of poverty? Do MFIs charge overly high lending rates and 
practice heavy-handed collection methods? The microcredit crisis following from 
microfinance-induced suicides in 2010 in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh 
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indicates that weak corporate governance and imprudent risk taking have far-reaching, 
dramatic consequences. 
In response, this study examines the impact of CEO power on MFI risk taking by 
deriving explicit predictions of this effect from a characterization of the microfinance 
industry. We thus expand on work by Adams et al. (2005) and Pathan (2009), who examine 
the relationship between CEO power and risk taking for publicly traded firms and commercial 
banks in the United States, respectively. Although MFIs are financial institutions, they differ 
fundamentally from commercial banks, mainly in that they pursue financial objectives 
together with social objectives and aim to reach the poorest customers possible. Moreover, 
most MFIs have distinctive ownership, in which profit-driven investors do not play primary 
roles. Thus managing an MFI may be more similar to managing a hospital or school than a 
commercial bank. 
Although a few MFIs are transforming into regulated, shareholder-based financial 
institutions, the majority remain driven by their social aims (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010), 
particularly those that function as nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These 
MFIs have no shareholders and lack high-powered equity ownership incentives, which likely 
discourages stakeholders from executing control rights. Moreover, no takeover market exists 
that might exercise external controls on management or the board of microfinance NGOs. 
The combination of weak governance and complex pursuits of both financial and 
social objectives has important consequences for MFIs’ risk profiles and the ways CEOs 
might influence MFI policy. Adopting the theoretical framework proposed by Adams et al. 
(2005), we argue that MFI managers in microfinance NGOs have substantial managerial 
discretion, such that CEO power should increase risk taking. To test this hypothesis 
empirically, we use two tests: a heteroskedasticity test (Adams et al., 2005; Cheng, 2008; 
Pathan, 2009) and a linear regression of the standard deviations of MFI performance over 
time based on CEO power and several controls. Our results contrast with those from prior 
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research (e.g., Pathan, 2009), which confirms the difference between microfinance NGOs and 
commercial banks in terms of CEO discretionary decision freedom. In addition, using quantile 
regressions, we show that the presence of powerful CEOs in microfinance NGOs not only 
induces more variable performance but is also associated with declining performance. 
Our findings thus call for stronger governance mechanisms for microfinance NGOs, 
whether through improved self-regulation or with stricter external oversights. Our analysis 
also reaffirms the appeal of transforming microfinance NGOs into regulated, shareholding, 
financial intermediaries. 
 
MICROFINANCE CONTEXT AND HYPHOTHESES 
In this section we provide a characterization of the variety of financial institutions that 
perform microfinance activities. From this characterization we draw on organization theory to 
argue that NGOs allow microfinance executives the most managerial discretion, such that 
CEOs are most likely to be able to influence outcomes in NGOs. To influence outcomes, a 
CEO also needs a sufficient degree of power. Power is a person’s ability to force another 
person to do something he or she otherwise would not have done (see Dahl, 1957). Thus 
power is a relational construct, and the exercise of power is in relation to others who may 
resist (Adams et al., 2005). Because the impact of powerful CEOs is likely to be higher in 
environments that provide greater discretion (Adams et al., 2005), we hypothesize that 
powerful CEOs increase NGO risk. 
Special Features of Microfinance NGOs 
Any characterization of MFIs is complicated by the variety of financial institutions 
that perform microfinance activities, including commercial banks,  credit unions, nonbank 
financial institutions (NBFI), and nonprofit organizations (e.g., NGOs) (Jansson et. al., 2004). 
As we noted previously, some MFIs are even transforming into regulated, shareholding, 
financial institutions, similar to commercial banks. The most common provider of 
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microfinance though is still socially oriented NGOs that provide microcredit to small informal 
entrepreneurs (Christen et al., 2003). We focus on these microfinancers; in Table I we also 
provide a typology of MFI forms, ranked according to the extent of managerial discretion 
they allow. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) use the concept of managerial discretion to 
explain why CEOs either do or do not affect firm performance and strategic decisions. 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) define managerial discretion as the “latitude of action in 
making strategic choices.” That is, discretion is the level of freedom or constraint faced by a 
CEO (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). It refers to a multidimensional concept that reflects 
the range of options available to an individual when taking consequential action (Caza, 2011). 
Executives with more freedom to implement decisions and relatively fewer constraints 
significantly shape their organizations; those with greater constraints and less freedom are less 
able to do so (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). We predict that especially in microfinance 
NGOs, CEOs have great managerial discretion.  
 
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE] 
We distinguish microfinance NGOs from normal commercial banks, NBFIs, and other 
banks particularly in terms of their (1) aims; (2) activities; (3) client features, loan portfolios, 
and lending technologies; (4) governance structures; and (5) operating environment. Despite 
some similarities between microfinance NGOs and credit unions/cooperatives in terms of 
aims and client features (see Table I), the financial transactions of cooperatives/credit unions 
usually are limited to registered members, such as those living in a certain region or working 
in a certain occupation (World Bank, 2005). 
Aims: Dual Objectives 
Microfinance NGOs pursue two often conflicting objectives: financial self-sufficiency 
and poverty reduction (Hermes et al., 2011). Commercial banks, NBFIs, and banks might 
claim to focus on social objectives as well, but ownership pressures (Mersland, 2009), their 
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financial structures (i.e., less donated capital, more commercial debt), and public regulations 
generally push these types of MFIs toward financial objectives. Furthermore, multitasking 
creates an incentive problem for managers, particularly if one of the goals is difficult to 
measure—“such as poverty reduction and female empowerment [which] are notoriously 
difficult to measure in a simple regular way” (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010, p. 357). 
Their mission—to reach the poor while simultaneously remaining financially 
sustainable—implies that executives of MFIs, especially NGOs, confront a situation in which 
it is not clear what is expected of them. The trade-off between financial sufficiency and 
poverty reduction implies that managers might justify their bad performance on one criterion 
by referring to the other; for example, their poor financial performance could be attributed to 
the social mission, especially because social performance is so difficult to measure. This 
problem is well known in multitask agency theory but difficult to solve (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991). Different CEOs disagree about whether to focus on financial stability or 
reaching the poor, and the lack of consensus might even enhance a CEO’s discretion. The 
CEOs of microfinance NGOs also have discretion over funds they receive from donors; if 
donor oversight is relatively poor, they may take advantage by investing in more high-risk 
projects. 
Powerful CEOs could use the ambiguity over organizational objectives to determine 
the outcomes of strategic decisions. For instance, CEOs that are also chairman of the board or 
founded the NGO, and thus have high structural power (Finkelstein, 1992), could use their 
formal position to decide whether the NGO should focus more on financial or social 
objectives. Therefore, we argue that the dual objectives of NGOs are likely to increase the 
impact of powerful CEOs on organizational outcomes. 
Activities 
The range of operations of microfinance NGOs tends to be much broader than that of 
commercial banks and other types of MFIs. In line with their dual objectives, they provide not 
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just financial services but also various social services, such as business development, health 
care provision, or literacy training (Maes and Foose, 2006). Business development services 
include a broad range of nonfinancial services, such as management or vocational skills 
training; marketing and technical assistance; technology access; productivity and product 
design; accounting and legal services; and access to various information about standards, 
regulations, or ideas in an enterprise field. Social services integrate credit with health, 
education, or other programs intended to raise health consciousness, health practices, and the 
use of formal healthcare. The wide operating framework of microfinance NGOs thus creates 
an ideal environment for a CEO who wants considerable freedom in making strategic choices. 
Especially in combination with the dual objectives of NGOs, it is unclear on which sectors 
NGOs should focus. Therefore powerful CEOs could use the structural power awarded by 
their formal position (Finkelstein, 1992) to decide in which sectors the NGO is active.  
Client Features, Loan Portfolio, and Lending Technology 
In terms of their financial activities, microfinance NGOs normally provide only 
microfinance loans. In contrast with commercial banks, microfinance banks, and NBFIs, they 
cannot offer savings or time deposits. Credit unions/cooperatives provide savings possibilities 
and loans only to their members. 
These distinctive client, lending technology, and loan portfolio features are interrelated 
and reflect the client characteristics of MFIs (Jansson et al., 2004). Loans normally are small 
and short-term, with relatively high interest rates, and they are not secured by collateral. The 
clients of microfinance NGOs tend to be low-income entrepreneurs, working in informal 
sectors, with no physical capital and limited formal documentation. Although clients are not 
inherently more risky than traditional bank clients, microlending activity as such may be, 
because it is so sensitive to management quality. Lending technologies use alternative 
incentive schemes, such as joint liability group lending or dynamic incentives, to encourage 
repayment. Moreover, normal banks consult formal documentation about clients before 
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granting loans, whereas microfinance NGOs usually do not evaluate loans based on formal 
financial information but instead rely on character and cash flow analyses during on-site 
inspections. The decision to grant a loan is mostly based on a field evaluation of the client’s 
ability to pay (Jansson et al., 2004), a credit rating procedure that is very difficult for outsiders 
to verify.  The lack of formal loan approval procedures gives CEOs considerable freedom in 
deciding on lending technologies and credit rating procedures. 
Governance Structure 
Microfinance NGOs are mostly organized as associations or foundations, which do not 
strictly have owners but rather feature organizational donors who contribute start-up funds 
(Jansson et al., 2004). Their “ownership” structure is dominated by the nonprofit 
organizations that created the MFI, including international or national NGOs, governmental 
aid organizations, multilateral donors, and other development-oriented organizations. In 
contrast, microfinance banks and NBFIs may include nonprofit investors among their 
shareholders, but they also work with profit-oriented private investors and shareholders. 
Cooperatives/credit unions are owned and managed by their members, following a one 
person–one vote principle (World Bank, 2005). 
Although best practices suggest that board members and the CEO should maintain 
some distance or independence, in many microfinance NGOs, the CEO/founder handpicks the 
board (Rock et. al., 1998), which may lead to a lack of proper oversight. A clear example of 
the problems that arise without proper oversight comes from the collapse of the Colombian 
microfinance NGO Corposol (Rock et al., 1998). The founder/CEO of Corposol initially 
enjoyed much respect and admiration for founding the successful MFI in 1988, leading to 
ownership and prestige power (Finkelstein, 1992). The CEO then increased his structural 
power by centralizing operational control and information, filling key management positions 
with friends, and marginalizing the influence of experienced middle managers. In 1995, 
consultants concluded that true autonomy existed only at the CEO level, with a management 
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team that served mainly as an “echo of his own ideas” (Steege, 1998, p. 89). 
Donors to microfinance NGOs also have few personal incentives to monitor risk-
taking behavior by the CEO, especially compared with profit-driven private investors and 
shareholders (Christen et al., 2003). This point is not to suggest that share-holding private 
investors do not engage in excessive risk taking; rather, in general, profit-driven investors 
seem to monitor management more closely than do social investors (Mersland, 2009). In 
addition, because microfinance NGOs are not listed on stock markets, decisions by their 
CEOs are not restricted by a takeover market that might exercise external controls. 
Finally, perhaps the greatest distinction between microfinance NGOs and other types 
of lenders is the non-distribution constraint. In theory, this constraint should restrict CEOs 
from exploiting the latitude afforded by the absence of private owners, because the 
distribution of excess earnings is not allowed. It also should commit the NGO to not cheating 
donors, customers, and workers (e.g., Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Hansmann, 1980). 
However, in practice the non-distribution constraint creates considerable organizational slack, 
because any excess profits go back to the organization. Financial shocks cannot be absorbed 
by shareholders but rather get absorbed by employees (e.g., varying wages) or clients of the 
MFI (e.g., changes to the services they receive; Fishman and Hubbard, 2005). To reduce the 
adverse effects of shocks, firms that face the non-distribution constraint may require 
precautionary savings, such as endowment fund balances provided by donors. However, these 
funds also facilitate misuse by CEOs, which implies that the fund balance itself supports 
greater managerial discretion (Fishman and Hubbard, 2003). The non-distribution constraint 
is often weakly binding too (Brhlíková and Ortmann, 2006), allowing the CEO to invest in 
risky projects with a lower probability of success that deliver more perks (e.g., a nice office). 
Together, these weak governance practices are a source of managerial discretion in all areas of 
microfinance NGOs’ operations.  
Environmental Characteristics 
  
 
Two central features of the microfinance environment are the rapid growth of the 
industry in general and the relative lack of regulation, especially for NGOs. 
Growth. 
Whereas in the early 1980s, microfinance institutions served only a few million 
clients, they reached more than 190 million families in 2009 (Reed, 2011). This rapid growth 
appears likely to continue, considering the size of the underserved market: Up to 3 billion 
people still lack access to proper financial services. Such growth levels also afford MFI CEOs 
with considerable discretion, because good performance creates organizational slack, 
enhances the CEOs’ position in the firm, and institutionalizes the position of the CEO; boards 
are less willing to fire CEOs of well-performing firms (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). In 
addition, Bradley et al. (2011) show that in high-growth industries financial slack is 
associated with lower performance. So in high-growth environments powerful CEOs are 
especially likely to influence NGO outcomes. 
Moreover, most MFIs are experiencing high portfolio growth on their own, prompting 
growth optimism, reinforced by past successes that have resulted in overconfidence and 
overly ambitious goals for many MFIs and their CEOs. The overconfidence (or hubris) of 
these CEOs also increases their risk taking (Li and Tang, 2010). An overconfident CEO 
overestimates his or her own problem-solving capabilities but underestimates the required 
resources and organizational uncertainties (Li and Tang, 2010). Consequently, CEO hubris, 
due to the enormous successes of microfinance, should strengthen the impact of CEO power 
on MFI risk taking. 
Lack of Regulation. 
Because the microfinance industry is a small part of the total financial sector, 
regulators can afford to ignore microfinance NGOs without endangering the stability of the 
financial system. In addition, in many countries, the formal banking industry is regulated by a 
central bank. Formal financial institutions take liquid deposits from the public and transform 
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them into risky, illiquid loans. If a bank suddenly must return deposits, it might lack the 
capacity if its funds all are tied up in illiquid loans, which prompts the failure of deposit-
taking institutions. Central bank regulations attempt to mitigate such risk, but most MFIs only 
offer credit products and no savings, which exempts them from regulations. Without savings 
products or equity issues, NGOs primarily rely on (foreign) donor money. In addition, the lack 
of regulation, and thus weak oversight, implies that CEOs could be tempted to invest in risky 
projects that deliver more perks (Fishman and Hubbard, 2005).  In general, the impact of CEO 
power will be greater in industries with minimal regulatory constraints (i.e., high 
environmental discretion) than in those with severe regulatory constraints (i.e., low 
environmental discretion). Thus, we anticipate that a lack of regulation strengthens the 
relationship between CEO power and CEO risk taking in MFIs. 
 
Taken together, the special features of microfinance NGOs—in terms of aims, 
activities, lending technology, corporate governance, and environment—should widen the 
scope of CEO discretion. As Glaeser (2003, p. 2) puts it, “managers of non-profit firms … 
have an almost unmatched degree of autonomy.” Furthermore, a direct relationship emerges 
between CEO power and managerial discretion. If a CEO is powerful, he or she has more 
discretion to influence decisions. Moreover, the impact of the CEO’s power depends on the 
degree of managerial discretion he or she has. Just as managerial discretion moderates the 
impact of CEO power on firm performance, it moderates the relationship between CEO power 
and firm risk taking.1 Adams et al. (2005), for instance, show that the impact of CEO power 
on performance variability is more pronounced in industries with fewer environmental 
constraints but more managerial discretion. Especially in firms and organizations with high 
managerial discretion, CEO power thus should lead to risk taking; CEO power and 
performance variability relate positively. Therefore, we predict 
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Hypothesis 1: In microfinance NGOs, CEO power increases risk taking; CEO power 
and performance variability relate positively. 
 
Powerful CEOs and MFI Performance 
Although our main objective is to examine the relationship between the presence of 
powerful CEOs and risk taking in microfinance NGOs, we also provide evidence with respect 
to the impact of powerful CEOs on microfinance performance. In theory, CEO power could 
have positive or negative effects on firm performance (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994); for 
example, it might encourage strong leadership and benefit incentive alignment. However, 
CEO power also could reduce the effectiveness of board monitoring and create a negative 
CEO entrenchment effect, which creates incentives for the CEO to extract private benefits. 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) propose a framework to integrate these opposing 
views: The negative effect dominates when the risk of entrenchment is high, such as when the 
CEO’s informal power is high or the firm performs well. Until quite recently, MFIs have 
earned nearly constant praise for their ability to reduce poverty in a financially viable manner. 
This positive reputation may increase the risk of CEO entrenchment. The risk of negative 
entrenchments effects also should increase if the possibilities for managerial discretion are 
high, as we have proposed they are in microfinance NGOs. In particular, the weak monitoring 
system, absence of profit-driven investors, and non-distribution constraint likely have 
noteworthy influences. Therefore, we hypothesize 
 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of powerful CEOs in microfinance NGOs is associated 
with declining performance. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Our data set is the one used by Mersland and Strøm (2009); it consists of information 
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compiled from rating reports (www.ratingfund2.org), as well as data from the risk assessment 
reports of five official microfinance rating agencies—MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet 
Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril—approved by the C-GAP Ratingfund. The rating methodologies 
reveal no major differences in MFI assessments relevant to the variables we study. 
Each rating agency obtains a maximum of four years of MFI financial data and 
characteristics to develop its ratings. The reports in our data set cover 280 MFIs from 60 
countries gathered during 2000–2007, and most of them refer to the past four years. We 
annualized and monetized all financial entries. However, the data set does not contain the 
largest, regulated microfinance banks, which have funders that demand traditional credit 
ratings, such as those offered by agencies like Standard & Poor’s. The virtually unlimited 
number of very small savings and credit cooperatives also do not appear in the data set, 
because they generally operate in isolation from the rest of the microfinance industry. We 
expect the effect of CEO power to be extremely high for these very small MFIs, which often 
lack adequate governance structures. In this regard, our estimates of CEO power are probably 
conservative. The 280 MFIs in the data set represent commercial, professionally oriented 
institutions that have decided to allow themselves to be rated to improve their access to 
funding, benchmark their status against others, and increase their transparency. 
[INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE] 
The rating agencies collected the data, which makes our data source more reliable than 
self-reported data sources such as Mixmarket (www.mixmarket.org) or questionnaires. 
Compared with those included in the 2006 Mixmarket Annual MFI Benchmarks, the MFIs in 
our sample are younger and smaller, have fewer credit clients, and hold smaller loan 
portfolios, though the median loan value is comparable. Table II contains the correlations of 
the variables in our panel; we present the descriptive panel statistics, together with a 
description of all variables, in Table III. In Panel A, we note that the average MFI in our 
sample has about $7.5 million in assets, an average loan size of $773, 7 board members, and 
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an age of approximately 11 years. We provide a cross-tabulation of the number of MFIs per 
region and type in Panel B; we have the most observations for NGOs, followed by NBFIs. In 
addition, most observations come from Latin America, followed by Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia and Africa. 
Methods 
To investigate our hypotheses, we use three different methods and consider different 
aspects of MFI performance variability. Extreme outcomes can materialize at different points 
in time for different MFIs, so we also address across-MFI performance variability and test our 
hypotheses using a panel of MFIs that should feature both across- and within-MFI variability. 
Similar to Adams et al. (2005) and Cheng (2008), we apply Glesjer’s (1969) 
heteroskedasticity test to pooled time-series data in two steps. First, we conduct a regression 
that explains MFI performance according to the following model: 
, 1 2 3 , , i t i i t i tROA CEO powerβ β e= + + +β Controls ,   (1) 
where ROA
i,t
 indicates return on assets for MFI i at time t, and CEO power is a dummy that 
indicates either CEO–chairperson duality or CEO is founder. It should be noted that there are 
different forms of power, including ownership, expert, prestige, and structural power 
(Finkelstein, 1992). However, our main focus is structural power, which relates to the CEO’s 
formal position in the organizational hierarchy and which we measure by two indicators: CEO 
duality and whether the CEO was the founder of the MFI. The residuals of this first step 
correspond to the unexpected portion of MFI performance. Therefore, the absolute value of 
the residuals are a sensible proxy for the unpredictability or variability of MFI performance. 
Second, to explain the variability of MFI performance, we regress the absolute value 
of the residuals on the same explanatory variables: 
, 1 2 3 , ,| |  i t i i t i tCEO powere γ γ υ= + + +γ Controls .   (2) 
The variability measure ,| |i te includes both across- and within-MFI variability. Across-MFI 
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variability is not necessarily related to managerial discretion. For example, powerful CEOs’ 
strategic deviance could have a positive effect for some MFIs but negative effects for others. 
These different impacts of CEO power in the cross-section could drive performance 
variability across MFIs. Therefore, to isolate the effect of managerial discretion, we 
investigate the effect of CEO power on within-MFI performance variability by regressing the 
standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) for each MFI over time on the average of our 
explanatory variables (i.e., horizontal bars indicate averages over time): 
1 2 3( )  ii iistd ROA CEO powerγ γ υ= + + +γ Controls .   (3) 
Finally, to test Hypothesis 2, we take a closer look at the extremes of the performance 
distribution. Managerial discretion cannot reveal whether the positive effect of CEO power on 
performance variability results from positive or negative deviations from the mean. Therefore, 
we might predict that CEO power has a symmetric impact on performance distribution: a 
negative impact on the lower quantiles and a comparably positive impact on the upper 
quantiles. Conversely, Hypothesis 2 considers only a negative impact on the lower quantiles, 
such that the increase in the standard deviation in Hypothesis 1 reflects negative deviations 
from the mean. 
We use quantile regression to investigate the impact of CEO power on different 
quantiles of the ROA distribution (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). For ease of exposition, we 
ignore the panel structure of the data and label the set of explanatory variables iX . Using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), we estimate parameters β for the conditional mean of ROA, 
 [ | ]i iE ROA X , which we obtain by minimizing the sum of squared deviations: 
( )2min
n
i i
i
ROA X
β
β′−∑
. Thus, the OLS method offers parameters for the mean of iROA , 
conditional on iX . With quantile regression, instead of obtaining parameters for the 
conditional mean function, we obtain parameters for the conditional median, 
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0.5[ | ]i iQ ROA X , by minimizing the sum of absolute deviations: 
min
n
i i
i
ROA X
β
β′−∑
. 
Unlike OLS, there is no closed form solution for this minimization problem, so we use 
numerical optimization methods to solve for β . Beyond the conditional median function, it is 
possible to solve the conditional quantile function, 
[ | ]q i iQ ROA X , for different quantiles q. 
Then the minimization becomes (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005): 
: :
min | | (1 ) | |
i i q i i q
n n
i i q i i q
i ROA X i ROA X
q ROA X q ROA X
β β β
β β
′ ′≥ <
′ ′− + − −∑ ∑
. (4) 
This asymmetric weighting procedure ensures that the minimization procedure chooses the 
conditional quantiles. If 0.90q = , more weight gets placed on predictions for observations 
with ROA X β′≥ than for observations with .ROA X β′< Thus, quantile regression enables us 
to estimate the effect of CEO power for the extremes of the ROA distribution. In the reported 
regressions, we choose the quantiles 0.10q = and 0.90q = and plot the regression coefficients 
from 0.10q = to 0.90q = against their corresponding confidence intervals, such that we can 
estimate the effect of CEO power over the entire ROA distribution. 
Dependent Variable 
The performance variables that typically assess the effect of governance on 
performance variability are ROA, Tobin’s Q, and stock returns. The latter two require a firm 
to be listed on a stock exchange. Most MFIs (cf. a few commercial organizations, such as 
Compartamos in Mexico and Equity Bank of Kenya) are not listed, so we only use ROA as a 
dependent variable. It should be noted that (stable) financial returns are very important for 
microfinance NGOs, because financial returns offer a key “social” indicator of whether the 
MFI will be able to continue to service its customers over time (Schreiner, 2002). 
Independent Variables 
Power. With the data available in the ratings reports, we can use two proxies for CEO 
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power. First, we proxy for the structural dimension of power, with the variable CEO = 
chairperson, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the chief executive is also chairperson of the 
board and 0 otherwise. As Table III shows, there is CEO duality only in 12% of the MFIs in 
our sample, so the distribution of CEO–chairpersons is skewed toward nonduality. Adams et 
al. (2005) note a similar problem (9%) in their sample. This skew further implies that our 
results are conservative, because the few CEO duality occurrences induce a bias toward no 
significant finding. Second, we consider CEO = founder, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
CEO founded the MFI and 0 otherwise. There has been some discussion about which power 
dimension this variable measures: Finkelstein (1992) uses it as a proxy for ownership power, 
whereas Adams et al. (2005) argue that it proxies for a dimension of structural power. In line 
with the resource-based view of the firm, we argue that a founder CEO is the person with the 
longest tenure in the MFI and possesses firm-specific, unique competencies. Management 
literature similarly suggests that CEO founders have “higher practical, analytical, and creative 
intelligence and that, together with entrepreneurial self-efficacy, it enables and motivates 
successful entrepreneurial behavior” (Baum and Bird, 2010). This form of power is 
interesting to investigate, because with a mean duration of 11 years, the MFIs in our sample 
are relatively young, and 34% still have their founders as their CEOs. 
 Interaction Term. Hypothesis 1 describes a relationship between two variables 
(performance variability and CEO power) that depends on a third (NGO status). To test it, we 
include an interaction term in the moderated regression (Aiken and West, 1991), for which we 
multiply CEO power by NGO status. By definition, the main effect of CEO power then 
measures the effect of CEO power in all other types of MFIs. Because we have two proxies 
for CEO power, we create two interaction effects: CEO = chairperson × NGO status and CEO 
= founder × NGO status. 
Control Variables 
As controls, we include no stakeholder electives, a dummy variable that indicates 
  
9
 
whether there are clients, donors, or employee representatives on the board; board size, 
because larger boards and more stakeholders with different perspectives should increase the 
effect of diverse opinions; and the number of international board members and international 
shareholders, which could offer international knowledge and good governance practices. 
Furthermore, we consider whether the CEO is female, because MFIs serve mainly female 
customers, who might be better served by a female CEO; Mersland and Strøm (2009) find 
that a female CEO increases financial performance. 
[INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE ] 
Our individual lending variable captures differences in performance that stem from 
different lending methods. Regulated indicates whether the MFI is regulated by banking 
authorities, which provides a good proxy of lender confidence in the MFI and the costs of 
implementing regulation. Urban lending captures the performance differences between MFIs 
that operate mainly in urban areas versus in rural areas. With MFI age, we measure MFI 
learning effects. To measure the size of an MFI, we use ln(Assets), which is the natural 
logarithm of assets and captures MFI scale economies. We proxy for outreach with the natural 
logarithm of the gross outstanding portfolio divided by the number of active credit clients to 
capture social performance, ln(Average Loan Size). This outreach measure helps control for a 
possible trade-off between social and financial performance. To capture diversification 
advantages, we use the number of branch offices. We provide a full explanation of these 
variables in Table III, which also shows that we include MFI organizational type and region 
dummies to control for MFI type- and region-specific fixed effects. 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
To summarize our initial evidence, in Table IV we present a simple variance F-test of the 
difference in the ROA variability for our panel. Panels A and B suggest that MFI performance 
variability is significantly higher for powerful CEOs. Panel C indicates a significant 
difference in performance variance between NGOs and all other types of MFIs. Panels D and 
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E confirm Hypothesis 1: NGOs with CEO–chairperson duality and in which the CEO is a 
founder achieve higher performance variability than MFIs in which there is no CEO–
chairperson duality and the CEO is not the founder, respectively. In Panels D and E, the 
difference in standard deviations is greater than that in Panels A and B, which suggests that 
CEO power increases performance variability more in NGOs than in other MFIs. 
[INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE] 
In Table V, we report the results we obtain from applying Glesjer’s (1969) 
heteroskedasticity test. Model 1 shows that the effect of CEO–chairperson duality on ROA 
variability is positive and significant. With a coefficient of 0.029, it is also economically large. 
The average absolute value of ROA residuals across all MFI years is 0.06. Moving from an 
MFI year in which the CEO is not chairperson to one in which the CEO is, the absolute value 
of ROA residuals increases by a factor of 48%. Adams et al. (2005) similarly find that having 
a founder CEO increases the absolute value of ROA residuals by a factor of 18.5%, though 
they do not find an effect of CEO duality. 
In Model 2, we add the interaction between CEO-chairperson duality and a dummy 
for whether the MFI is an NGO. This interaction effect is positive and significant, in support 
of Hypothesis 1. Judging from the increase in the adjusted R-square value, the addition of the 
interaction effect explains more variance. In addition, the model has a somewhat better fit, 
judging from the decrease in the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The main effect of 
CEO–chairperson duality is no longer significant in Model 2. By construction, the main effect 
in Model 2 measures the effect of CEO–chairperson duality on performance variability for all 
MFIs other than NGOs; therefore, CEO–chairperson duality has no effect on variability in 
these other types of MFIs. 
Our panel analyses reveal no evidence for Hypothesis 1 when we use CEO = founder 
as a power proxy. Model 3 shows that the effect of a CEO founder on ROA variability is not 
significant; Model 4 shows that the interaction of the CEO = founder variable and NGO status 
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is not significant either. 
[INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE] 
Similar to Cheng (2008), we find a negative effect of board size on performance 
variability, which matches our expectations according to the diversification of opinions effect. 
That is, group decisions by bigger boards demand more consensus, resulting in less extreme 
outcomes. To derive the economic significance of these results, consider an increase in board 
size of one standard deviation (i.e., 3.72 directors): It decreases the absolute value of ROA 
residuals by -0.003 × 3.72 = -0.01, which implies a decrease in the absolute value of ROA 
variability of 17%. 
Contrary to our expectations, MFIs without stakeholder electives exhibit less 
performance variability. We expected such boards to be more homogeneous and thus make 
more extreme decisions. We find a negative effect of being a credit union or cooperative, as 
we expected, because different cooperative members must agree to reach consensus. In 
addition, larger MFIs have less performance variability, judging from the negative effect of 
ln(assets) in Models 1–4. Also, MFIs with less outreach (smaller average loan size) are 
associated with less performance variability in Models 1 and 2, which suggests a possible 
trade-off between risk and outreach. 
[ INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE ] 
We isolate the effect of within-MFI performance variability by estimating Equation 3 
without the region dummies, as we show in Table VI. The most surprising result is that 
Models 1 and 3 indicate no effect of CEO power on within-MFI performance variability, but 
the interaction effects between CEO power and NGO type are significant in Models 2 and 4. 
In contrast with our panel regression, we find that CEO = founder has a positive effect on 
performance variability in NGOs, in support of Hypothesis 1, though only at a 10% 
significance level. The effect is economically sizeable; in NGOs, compared with the average 
within-MFI standard deviation of 0.05, CEO–chairperson duality and CEO = founder increase 
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the standard deviation by 0.08 and 0.04, respectively. Furthermore, the main effect of a CEO–
chairperson becomes significantly negative; in MFIs other than NGOs, this type of duality 
decreases performance variability. Finally, the cross-section analyses confirm the panel 
analyses: Larger MFIs and those with lower average loan balances experience less 
performance variability, which suggests a possible trade-off between risk and outreach. 
[INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE] 
To investigate Hypothesis 2, we perform quantile regression for a sample of NGOs 
only. We first consider q = 0.10 and q = 0.90 and display the results of estimating Models 1 
and 3 in Table VII. A CEO–chairperson duality significantly decreases ROA by 12% for q = 
0.10, but it has no significant effect for q = 0.90. Among the worst performing MFIs in our 
sample, CEO–chairperson duality has a negative effect on performance, but there is no effect 
for the best performing MFIs. In support of our panel analyses in Table IV, in unreported 
results we find no effect of CEO = founder for either the low or the high quantile of the ROA 
distribution. Finally, the CEO = female variable is positively associated with ROA 
performance for the high quantile of the ROA distribution, in line with Mersland and Strøm’s 
(2009) finding of a positive effect of female CEOs on average ROA. 
 [INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Instead of two quantile estimates, we can investigate multiple quantile estimates by 
plotting them. In Figure 1, we therefore include 17 quantile estimates from q = 0.10 to 0.90 
for CEO–chairperson duality, with a solid line to connect the estimates. The gray area 
represents the 95% confidence interval; a quantile estimate is significant if the grey area does 
not include the zero line. The OLS estimate is represented by the dotted line. Similar to 
Mersland and Strøm (2009), we find that the median estimate (q = 0.5) of CEO–chairperson 
duality is insignificant, but it emerges as significant for quantiles below q = 0.2, because the 
confidence intervals no longer include 0. Finally, we find no effect of CEO = founder on any 
of the quantiles of the ROA distribution. 
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To contrast NGOs with other MFIs, we also plot CEO–chairperson duality and CEO = 
founder for the sample of all other MFIs in the two lower plots in Figure 1. Neither CEO–
chairperson duality nor CEO = founder has any effect on the lower quantiles of the ROA 
distribution, though CEO = founder has a marginally significant effect on the upper quantiles, 
which suggests that for other MFIs with high financial performance, there are positive effects 
of CEO power. 
DISCUSSION 
Existing literature on CEO power and firm risk taking has been conducted in the 
context of limited liability firms and commercial banks (see Adams et al., 2005, and Pathan, 
2009). This study centers instead on the impact of CEO power on risk taking in the context of 
MFIs. Drawing on research in organization theory, we have argued that CEO power is 
positively associated with risk taking, because extreme decisions are more likely when the 
CEO is the primary decision maker, rather than when several executives have decision-
making power. As a proxy for CEO structural power, we consider CEO duality; in an 
alternative analysis, we also measure CEO power according to whether the CEO was a 
founder of the MFI. In line with managerial discretion literature, we have conjectured that the 
effect of CEO power on risk taking is greater if CEOs face fewer decision-making constraints 
(i.e., managerial discretion is high). 
Microfinance usually is provided by nonbanking institutions, such as microfinance 
NGOs, which differ greatly from commercial banks and other types of MFIs in terms of their 
lending procedures, range of activities, objectives, investors, markets, and non-distribution 
constraints. We argue that the special features of microfinance NGOs enhance managerial 
discretion, and our empirical evidence confirms that CEO power in microfinance NGOs 
increases risk taking. That is, CEO duality and, to a lesser extent, CEOs who are founders 
relate positively to MFI performance variability, in panel and cross-sectional study contexts. 
We also have shown that the presence of powerful CEOs in other types of MFIs does not 
  2
4
 
significantly increase their risk taking, which confirms our hypothesis that microfinance 
NGOs are special and exhibit particularly high managerial discretion. We thus can compare 
our results with Pathan (2009), who studied the impact of CEO power on risk taking for a 
large sample of U.S. banks. In that study, CEO power negatively affected risk taking, though 
not significantly according to Glejser’s heteroskedasticty tests. This result is similar to our 
finding for other types of MFIs, which is reasonable: This group of MFIs consists mainly of 
microfinance banks and NBFI that are similar in many respects to normal commercial banks. 
Although it is not the main focus of our analysis, our study also suggests that the 
presence of powerful CEOs in microfinance NGOs is associated with declining performance. 
Adams et al. (2005), in their study of CEO power and risk taking among private firms, find no 
evidence of a negative effectááá of CEO power though; rather, their study suggests that firms 
with powerful CEOs exhibit both the best and the worst performance. Our findings contradict 
this claim though, because the centralization of power in the hands of CEOs in microfinance 
NGOs is consistently bad for performance. Apparently, organizational slack and latitude in 
strategic decision making that marks microfinance NGOs facilitates managerial “stealing.” 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Although our study is focused on the relationship between CEO power and risk taking 
in MFIs, the results have wider application, particularly with regard to the role of CEOs in 
NGOs in general. The presence of powerful CEOs in NGOs may be associated with higher 
return variability. In some types of NGOs, depending on the services they provide, 
stakeholders may dislike (donors) or be vulnerable to (recipients) such performance variation. 
Moreover, our study hints at factors that increase CEOs’ managerial discretion that have not 
been analyzed previously. By analyzing the relationship between CEO power and risk taking 
in microfinance NGOs, we highlight the enhanced discretion that results from the absence of 
profit-driven investors. Furthermore, the non-distribution constraint in NGOs appears only 
weakly binding and incompletely enforced, such that it can enable CEOs to divert donor 
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funds for their own use. Overall, we note the relevance of studying the relative importance of 
various factors that distinguish NGOs from for-profit businesses, in terms of enhancing CEO 
decision freedom. 
 Our study also strongly suggests that it is necessary to reduce the strategic decision 
power of CEOs in microfinance NGOs. Various instruments could improve the governance 
structure of microfinance NGOs to help avoid undue risk taking by CEOs, such as better 
internal control schemes, internal auditing procedures, and more oversight by donors, possibly 
in the form of donor representation in the board. Examining the various possibilities for 
reducing the CEO’s strategic decision power should be an important area for further research. 
Moreover, for the microfinance industry, our study emphasizes the relevance of transforming 
unregulated microfinance NGOs into regulated, shareholding, financial intermediaries with 
better governance and ownership structures. 
Limitations 
The results of this study should be viewed in light of its limitations. First, 
microfinance research is persistently plagued by data limitations. Our data set is the only one 
that contains governance variables, but it features only rated MFIs. It is not representative of 
the total population of MFIs; in particular, it excludes very big MFIs rated by regular bank 
rating agencies and very small MFIs that are not rated at all. The rating agencies only rated 
the MFIs once during our sample period, so our governance variables also do not change over 
time, and we cannot assess the effects of changes in governance. 
Second, we use CEO–chairperson duality and CEO as a founder to proxy for the 
complex notion of CEO structural power. These proxies are relevant, but they cannot reflect 
the informal power that derives from managerial characteristics, such as aspiration level, 
commitment, or locus of control (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Our analysis primarily 
deals with one dimension of power; this study does not mean to imply that all forms of CEO 
power induce risk taking and/or are bad. 
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Third, though our theoretical arguments suggest a causal relationship between CEO 
power and performance variability, we cannot preclude reverse causality: Higher performance 
variability could influence CEO power. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that an increase in 
uncertainty increases the scope for moral hazard. When uncertainty, as proxied by 
performance variability, increases, boards should put more constraints on a CEO’s behavior. 
Then performance variability would lead to less CEO power. Alternatively, boards may value 
CEO power, especially when the firm’s performance is poor (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994), 
to signal there is a “captain in charge of the ship.” We find that CEO power is closely 
associated with the worst NGO performance; perhaps then the worst performers grant their 
CEO more power. To resolve this issue, further microfinance research needs instruments for 
CEO power (e.g., Adams et al., 2005), which currently are not available. 
Fourth, our analysis looks at the impact of CEO power on risk taking in terms of 
financial variables. It does not consider the social consequences of the presence of powerful 
CEOs in microfinance NGOs. 
CONCLUSION 
Although literature on microfinance is voluminous, consideration of the governance of 
MFIs remains scant. This article offers an initial investigation into the effect of governance on 
MFI risk taking. Building on prior research, we argue that managers in microfinance NGOs 
have managerial discretion, so CEO power increases risk taking. We find, regarding the 
drivers of greater performance variability, that CEO power in NGOs is associated with 
declining performance. Therefore, good governance in microfinance NGOs is needed to guard 
against powerful CEOs. 
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Table I. Managerial discretion typology of MFIs 
 
NGOs Cooperatives / Credit 
Unions 
NBFIs Banks 
    
Not regulated Not regulated Partly regulated Regulated 
Non-distribution 
constraint 
Distribute profits to 
members 
Distribute profits to 
owners 
Distribute profits to 
owners 
Governance not tied to 
ownership 
Governance tied to 
members 
Governance tied to 
ownership 
Governance tied to 
ownership 
Dual objectives Dual objectives Financial objectives Financial objectives 
    
 
Most             Managerial discretion             Least 
 
  
Table II. Correlations
                      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) Return on assets 1                    
(2) CEO = chairperson -0.09 1                   
(3) CEO = founder -0.04 0.15 1                  
(4) No stakeholder electives -0.02 0.11 -0.04 1                 
(5) Board size 0.07 -0.14 0.04 0.05 1                
(6) International board members 0.02 -0.16 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 1               
(7) International shareholders -0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.08 -0.13 0.40 1              
(8) CEO = female 0.17 0.02 0.23 -0.16 0.21 -0.07 -0.18 1             
(9) Individual lending 0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.10 -0.22 -0.01 0.11 -0.07 1            
(10) Regulated 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.33 -0.06 0.16 0.12 -0.01 0.24 1           
(11) Urban lending 0.11 -0.09 -0.16 0.28 0.02 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.22 -0.12 1          
(12) MFI age 0.03 -0.09 -0.10 -0.03 0.29 -0.25 -0.23 -0.15 -0.04 0.07 0.02 1         
(13) ln(Assets) 0.22 0.07 0.07 -0.13 0.05 0.17 0.04 -0.03 0.24 0.26 -0.11 0.16 1        
(14) ln(Average loan size) 0.09 -0.14 0.06 -0.14 -0.23 0.06 0.07 -0.06 0.58 0.21 0.02 -0.08 0.40 1       
(15) Branch offices 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.35 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 0.13 0.01 0.44 0.37 -0.18 1      
(16) Bank 0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.17 0.12 -0.08 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.20 1     
(17) Nonbank financial institution -0.12 0.12 0.02 -0.11 -0.29 0.23 0.58 -0.16 0.08 0.37 -0.08 -0.27 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 1    
(18) NGO 0.12 -0.08 -0.09 0.29 0.19 -0.14 -0.45 0.04 -0.15 -0.48 0.15 0.10 -0.20 -0.18 0.02 -0.20 -0.69 1   
(19) Cooperative/credit union -0.03 -0.11 0.12 -0.43 0.12 -0.15 -0.10 0.23 0.12 0.24 -0.11 0.28 0.09 0.18 -0.02 -0.05 -0.16 -0.41 1  
(20) State bank -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 0.07 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 -0.06 0.12 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 1 
                      
Notes: The table presents univariate correlations. We use case-wise deletion, such that the correlations reflect only those observations for which no listed variables are missing. 
 
  
Table III. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Summary Statistics       
Return on assets 926 0.01 0.03 0.13 -0.90 0.79 
CEO = chairperson 803 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
CEO = founder 205 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
No stakeholder electives 926 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Board size 812 7.34 7.00 3.72 2.00 33.00 
International board members 700 0.56 0.00 1.20 0.00 6.00 
International shareholders 926 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
CEO = female 768 0.25 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Individual lending 877 0.57 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Regulated 925 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Urban lending 926 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
MFI age 923 11.06 8.00 9.24 0.00 80.00 
Assets 919 7.50E+06 3.10E+06 1.60E+07 40467.00 2.50E+08 
ln(Assets) 919 14.94 14.94 1.32 10.61 19.34 
Average loan size 905 772.52 446.00 1318.12 15.00 24589.00 
ln(Average loan size) 905 6.05 6.10 1.09 2.71 10.11 
Branch offices 899 12.54 7.00 19.06 1.00 129.00 
 
Regions A EE 
EE & 
CA LA 
ME & 
NA SA Total 
Panel B: Cross-tabulation number of MFIs per MFI type and region 
Bank 19 5 3 12 0 3 42 
Nonbank financial institution 39 33 33 96 7 5 213 
NGO 55 21 95 299 37 32 539 
Cooperative/credit union 32 1 7 59 0 5 104 
State bank 0 0 0 11 0 0 11 
Other 3 0 10 4 0 0 17 
        
Total 148 60 148 481 44 45 926 
 
Notes: ROA = net operating income/average annual assets. CEO = chairperson is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
CEO and the chair of the board are the same person. CEO = founder is a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO is also 
the founder of the MFI. No stakeholder electives equals 1 when no clients, donors, or employees serve on the 
board. Board size indicates the number of MFI board members. International board members indicates the number 
of international board members. International shareholders equals 1 if an MFI has international shareholders. CEO 
= female is a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO is a woman. Individual lending equals 1 if the MFI mainly conducts 
individual lending as opposed to group lending. Regulated equals 1 if the MFI is regulated by banking authorities 
in the country. Urban equals 1 if an MFI’s main market is urban as opposed to rural. MFI age = year – start-up 
year. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of assets. Ln(Average loan size) is the natural logarithm of (gross 
outstanding portfolio/number of active credit clients). Branch offices indicates the number of branch offices. The 
regions are Africa (A), East Asia and the Pacific (EA & P), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EE & CA), Latin 
America (LA), Middle East & North Africa (ME & NA) and South Asia (SA). 
 
  
 
Table IV. Variance F-tests of equality of performance variance 
  
Panel A. H0 : CEO = chairperson  
CEO = chairperson (std.) 0.09 
Number of observations 33 
CEO ≠ chairperson (std.) 0.07 
Number of observations 208 
Variance F-test 6.954 
P-value [0.00] 
  
Panel B. H0: CEO = founder  
CEO = founder (std.) 0.09 
Number of observations 69 
CEO ≠ founder (std.) 0.07 
Number of observations 136 
Variance F-test 3.618 
P-value [0.03] 
  
Panel C. H0: MFI = NGO  
MFI = NGO (std.) 0.14 
Number of observations 542 
MFI ≠ NGO (std.) 0.11 
Number of observations 389 
Variance F-test 13.389 
P-value [0.00] 
  
Panel D. H0: CEO = chairperson & MFI = NGO 
CEO = chairperson & MFI = NGO (std.) 0.11 
Number of observations 21 
CEO ≠ chairperson or MFI ≠ NGO (std.) 0.07 
Number of observations 220 
Variance F-test 7.447 
P-value [0.00] 
  
Panel E. H0: CEO = founder & MFI = NGO 
CEO = chairperson & MFI = NGO (std.) 0.12 
Number of observations 39 
CEO ≠ chairperson or MFI ≠ NGO (std.) 0.07 
Number of observations 166 
Variance F-test 4.312 
P-value [0.01] 
  
Notes: We report a robust version of the variance F-test of Brown and Forsythe 
(1974), in which the mean is replaced by the 10% trimmed mean. We perform an 
F-test of the difference in the variance of the return on assets and operational 
costs. We report means for these variables with their standard deviation in 
parentheses; we report the F-statistic with the p-value in square brackets. 
  
Table V. Panel performance variability as a function of CEO power and NGO status 
Dependent variable Absolute value of ROA residuals 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CEO = chairperson 0.029** (0.014) -0.002 (0.018)     
CEO = chairperson × NGO-status   0.044* (0.025)     
CEO = founder     0.007 (0.007) -0.002 (0.011) 
CEO = founder × NGO-status       0.014 (0.015) 
No stakeholder electives -0.016* (0.009) -0.017* (0.009) -0.019** (0.007) -0.023*** (0.008) 
Board size -0.003*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 
International board members 0.003 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 0.006 (0.004) 
International Shareholders 0.007 (0.012) -0.003 (0.012) -0.009 (0.012) -0.013 (0.013) 
CEO = female 0.001 (0.006) -0.001 (0.007) 0.003 (0.008) 0.003 (0.009) 
Individual lending -0.000 (0.007) -0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007) 0.003 (0.007) 
Regulated -0.009 (0.006) -0.011* (0.006) -0.012* (0.007) -0.019*** (0.007) 
Urban lending -0.007 (0.007) -0.007 (0.006) -0.010 (0.007) -0.009 (0.007) 
MFI age 0.001* (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
ln(Assets) -0.012*** (0.004) -0.013*** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) 
ln(Average loan size) -0.011** (0.005) -0.010** (0.005) -0.001 (0.004) -0.000 (0.004) 
Branch offices -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Bank -0.015 (0.033) -0.014 (0.029) -0.004 (0.029) 0.000 (0.029) 
Non-bank financial institution -0.023 (0.031) -0.025 (0.027) -0.008 (0.026) -0.001 (0.027) 
NGO -0.022 (0.029) -0.034 (0.025) -0.019 (0.024) -0.020 (0.025) 
Cooperative/credit union -0.044 (0.031) -0.054* (0.027) -0.054** (0.027) -0.050* (0.028) 
State bank 0.022 (0.032) 0.010 (0.029) 0.043 (0.026) 0.045* (0.027) 
Constant 0.351*** (0.071) 0.384*** (0.069) 0.316*** (0.079) 0.316*** (0.079) 
Observations 481  481  415  415  
Adjusted R-squared 0.166  0.173  0.144  0.152  
AIC -1339  -1343  -1196  -1208  
 
Notes: This table reports the estimations of Equation 2. We include MFI type dummies for banks, non-bank financial institutions, cooperatives/credit unions, and 
state banks, excluding other types. We include region dummies for Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and the 
Middle East and North Africa, excluding South Asia. We report robust standard errors clustered by MFI in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.  
  
Table VI. Cross-section regressions: performance variability over time as a function of CEO power and NGO Status 
Dependent variable Standard deviation of ROA 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CEO = chairperson -0.008 (0.020) -0.057* (0.031)     
CEO = chairperson × NGO   0.079** (0.034)     
CEO = founder     0.016 (0.012) -0.008 (0.018) 
CEO = founder × NGO       0.038* (0.022) 
No stakeholder electives -0.002 (0.012) -0.005 (0.011) 0.001 (0.011) -0.002 (0.010) 
Board size -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
International board members 0.002 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 
International Shareholders -0.012 (0.026) -0.023 (0.025) -0.033 (0.027) -0.035 (0.027) 
CEO = female -0.001 (0.011) -0.005 (0.011) -0.006 (0.012) -0.006 (0.012) 
Individual lending -0.004 (0.009) -0.001 (0.009) -0.004 (0.008) -0.002 (0.008) 
Regulated -0.005 (0.012) -0.006 (0.012) -0.004 (0.015) -0.006 (0.015) 
Urban lending -0.002 (0.010) -0.002 (0.010) -0.003 (0.009) -0.004 (0.009) 
MFI age -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
ln(Assets) -0.010** (0.005) -0.012*** (0.004) -0.016*** (0.004) -0.016*** (0.004) 
ln(Average loan size) -0.022* (0.011) -0.023** (0.011) -0.011 (0.009) -0.010 (0.009) 
Branch offices 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Bank -0.019 (0.035) -0.035 (0.027) -0.013 (0.040) -0.003 (0.045) 
Non-bank financial institution -0.025 (0.036) -0.034 (0.029) 0.003 (0.039) 0.007 (0.044) 
NGO -0.047 (0.032) -0.072*** (0.027) -0.042 (0.029) -0.053 (0.035) 
Cooperative/credit union -0.051 (0.034) -0.071** (0.028) -0.046 (0.032) -0.044 (0.038) 
State bank 0.012 (0.043) -0.013 (0.041) 0.044 (0.037) 0.043 (0.041) 
Constant 0.392*** (0.090) 0.459*** (0.092) 0.380*** (0.088) 0.382*** (0.089) 
Observations 133  133  112  112  
Adjusted R-squared 0.153  0.188  0.188  0.203  
AIC -368.6  -373.4  -329.9  -331.2  
Notes: This table reports the estimations of Equation 3. We include MFI type dummies for banks, non-bank financial institutions, cooperatives/credit unions, and 
state banks, excluding other types. We include region dummies for Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and the 
Middle East and North Africa, excluding South Asia. We report robust standard errors clustered by MFI in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
  
Table VII. Pooled quantile regressions in the NGO sample 
Dependent variable ROA quantile = 0.10 ROA quantile = 0.90 ROA quantile = 0.10 ROA quantile = 0.90 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 1 Model 3 Model 3 
CEO = chairperson -0.121** (0.050) -0.015 (0.024)     
CEO = founder     -0.008 (0.027) 0.029 (0.023) 
No stakeholder electives 0.037 (0.024) -0.018 (0.026) 0.050** (0.022) 0.004 (0.022) 
Board size 0.006* (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 
International board members -0.017 (0.016) 0.007 (0.007) -0.019 (0.017) 0.016** (0.008) 
CEO = female 0.037* (0.022) 0.065*** (0.017) 0.039 (0.028) 0.066*** (0.019) 
Individual lending 0.031 (0.021) -0.006 (0.025) 0.006 (0.029) 0.008 (0.024) 
Regulated 0.048 (0.035) -0.026 (0.023) 0.063 (0.044) -0.033 (0.038) 
Urban lending -0.012 (0.019) -0.010 (0.017) -0.017 (0.026) -0.035* (0.018) 
MFI age -0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
ln(Assets) 0.018* (0.010) -0.004 (0.010) 0.031** (0.014) -0.002 (0.014) 
ln(Average loan size) 0.017 (0.013) -0.008 (0.015) -0.012 (0.013) 0.007 (0.016) 
Branch offices 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Constant -0.467*** (0.157) 0.212 (0.161) -0.509*** (0.155) 0.088 (0.231) 
Observations 315  315  264  264  
Pseudo R-squared 0.262   0.175   0.241   0.192   
Notes: We report the quantile regression estimations. To correct for possible heteroskedasticity, we use bootstrapped standard errors with 10,000 bootstrap 
replications. We include region dummies for Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East and North 
Africa, excluding South Asia. We report robust p-values clustered by MFI in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
  
 
Figure 1. Quantile estimates return on assets 
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Notes: The first sample contains 315 NGO observations, and the second sample contains all other 
MFIs (166 observations). The solid line indicates the quantile estimate, the dashed line indicates the 
OLS estimate, and the shaded area is the 95% confidence interval of the quantile estimates. To 
correct for possible heteroskedasticity, we used bootstrapped standard errors with 10,000 bootstrap 
replications. We exclude MFI type dummies for obvious reasons. We include region dummies for 
Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and the Middle 
East and North Africa, excluding South Asia. 
 
  
NOTES 
                                                 
1 Considerable literature notes a positive relationship between CEO power and firm 
risk taking. A less powerful CEO must compromise with other board members, leaving less 
room for extreme decisions (Adams et al., 2005). Social psychology literature also considers 
the effect of group processes on different dimensions of group decisions, such as extremity or 
riskiness. Thus Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969, p. 125) assert that the “group consensus is an 
averaging, a compromise among individual positions.” In economics literature, Sah and 
Stiglitz (1986, 1991) claim that group decision making demands a “diversification of 
opinions” effect, so a group decision represents a compromise based on group members’ 
different opinions, and a project begins only if a sufficient number of group members agree. 
The power of a particular group member thus should lead to more extreme outcomes, as 
confirmed by several empirical studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2005; Cheng, 2008; Kogan and 
Wallach, 1966; Tang et al., 2011). 
 
